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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ERNEST HINES and 
JOHNNIE LEACH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8346 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondent agrees with the Statement of the 
Case set forth in appellants' brief. 
STArrEMENT OF FACTS 
Except for certain added emphasis on the part of 
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the appellants, respondent agrees substantially with 
their Statement of Facts. 
STATENIENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO 
APPOINT A SECOND ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
LEACH AFTER HE HAD ARBITRARILY DISCHARGED 
A COMPETENT COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY, CITED IN POINT II OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF, AND APPELLANTS FAILED TO MAKE EX-
CEPTION TO THEM. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HINES WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO 
THE READING OF TESTIMONY TO THE JURY AFTER 
THE JURY'S RETIREMENT; AND THE COURT DID 
NOT ALLOW UNDUE EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON 
A PORTION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS DISCRETIONARY WITH THE JUDGE 
WHETHER OR NOT TO REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF 
COUNSEL DURING THE READING OF TESTIMONY 
TO THE JURY AFTER ITS RETIREMENT; AND IT 
WAS NOT ERROR TO ALLOW SUCH READING IN 
COUNSEL'S ABSENCE. 
POINT V 
IT WAS NOT ERROR ON THE PART OF THE COURT 
TO ALLOW MISS PARKER, THE COURT STENOG-
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RAPHER, TO TAKE TWO WOMEN JURORS TO THE 
LADIES' RESTROOM. 
POINT VI 
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE JURY WAS AT ALL 
TIMES PROPERLY ADMONISHED; THE APPELLANTS 
DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION AT THE TRIAL AND 
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DO SO NOW; AND IF 
THE JURY WAS NOT ADMONISHED IMMEDIATELY 
PRIOR TO A SHORT INFORMAL RECESS, APPEL-
LANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED IN THEIR SUBSTAN-
TIAL RIGHTS. 
POINT VII 
IF ERRORS WERE MADE BY THE COURT BELOW, 
THEY WERE, IN EVERY CASE, NONPREJUDICIAL 
ERRORS WITHOUT NEGATIVE AFFECT UPON THE 
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED APPEL-
LANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO 
APPOINT A SECOND ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
LEACH AFTER HE HAD ARBITRARILY DISCHARGED 
A COMPETENT COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY. 
Respondent agrees that it appears to be a matter 
of first impression in the State of Utah whether the 
trial court is under a duty to appoint counsel for an 
accused in a criminal case where the accused has dis-
charged court-appointed counsel. There is, however, 
precedent from other jurisdictions, both federal and 
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state, that would indicate that the court is not obligated 
to appoint further counsel. 
It is enough that the court appointed a competent 
criminal attorney and it was not necessary that the court 
appoint a second attorney after Appellant Leach m-
formed Mr. Reid, his court-appointed counsel, he no 
longer desired to be represented by him. 
It is sufficient in such a situation that the court-
appointed counsel be a reputable member of the bar. 
Beyond that, it is not the prerogative of an indigent 
defendant in a criminal case to choose his attorney who 
must then lay aside all else and work for him free of 
charge. 
The defendant cannot have tailor-made counsel and 
he cannot run a relay race using a court-appointed attor-
ney for a season, then replacing him with a new fresh 
one of his own choosing, but under court appointment. 
One good, capable attorney, such as Mr. Reid, was 
enough for Mr. Leach. 
State v. Griffith, 81 A. 2d 383, held: 
''A person accused of crime is only entitled to 
counsel to aid him in his defense, not to save him 
from his voluntary act." 
Leach's foolishness here in discharging reputable 
and able counsel was a voluntary act, from the effects of 
which it was not necessary that the court attempt to 
save him through appointment of a second attorney. 
U. 8. v. Gutterman, 147 Fed. 2d 540, states: 
''An accused unable to employ an attorney 
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must accept such counsel as the court assigns 
unless he can find a better reason for asking a 
change than the fact that the accused does not 
approve of counsel's judgment or unless the 
accused chooses to undertake his own defense.'' 
People v. Adamson, (Calif.), 210 P. 2d 13, in a hold-
ing based on comparable, if not precisely similar, facts 
stated: 
"A defendant's right to counsel did not in-
clude the right to postpone trial indefinitely and 
reject the services of the public defender while 
defendant, at his leisure, attempted to find coun-
sel who would serve without charge and of whom 
the defendant and another person approved.'' 
A Michigan case, People v. Kotak, 11 N. W. 2d 7, 
informs us that under a statute providing for the ap-
pointment of an attorney for an accused unable to pro-
vide his own counsel, the appointment of an attorney 
chosen by the accused is not required. 
It was held in U.S. ex rel Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 
Fed. Supp. 683, that the court's choice of counsel for 
defendant should not be subject to impeachment on a 
ground of a claimed displeasure with the appointment 
or a lack of confidence in the attorney, unless there is 
good cause why the appointment should not have been 
made; and that the choice of counsel for indigent persons 
accused of crime rests with the court and not with the 
defendant. 
Appellants refer to Ex Parte Masching, 261 P. 2d 
251. That case, however, involved a defendant to whom 
no counsel had been assigned in the first instance. Here, 
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Appellant Leach had assigned to him by the court the 
excellent services of a widely experienced and capable 
attorney. 
No denial is attempted that defendant had an in-
herent constitutional right to counsel. That is rudi-
mentary law. Counsel was, in fact, obtained and prof-
fered him by the court. Appellant Leach does not allege 
that counsel assigned was unwilling or unable to go 
ahead. Leach summarily dismissed Mr. Reid and there-
by, and with adequate chance to repent of his error, 
waived his right to court appointment of counsel. (Tr. 
15) 
In the Masching Case, the defendant was an alleged 
traffic violator who claimed to have been bedridden with 
illness for three weeks and to have been unable to get 
counsel. The court thereupon refused to appoint an 
attorney. That case and this one are inimical on their 
facts and the holding in the Masching Case should not 
concern this Court. 
The Robinson Case and the Glasser Case (Appel-
lants' Brief, p. 18) indicate, as appellants stated, that 
one attorney cannot be forced on co-defendants. There 
was no forcing here at all. In the first place, the co-
defendants agreeably accepted Mr. Reid as their attor-
ney, and he represented both at the preliminary hearing. 
Afterward, Appellant Leach determined to dismiss Mr. 
Reid. 
The Glasser Case forbids the appointment of one 
counsel to represent ''conflicting interests.'' There is 
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no showing here of any conflict whatsoever. Counsel 
present·s to us three ''points of conflict'' which he claims 
to be reason enough to prevent acceptance of dual repre-
sentation. These reasons were not sufficiently impres-
sive to prevent the acceptance, willingly, by both Hines 
and Leach, of Mr. Reid in the first place. If Appellant 
Leach wanted to hire representation of his own choosing 
at that or any later date, he had every right and enough 
opportunity to do it. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY, CITED IN POINT II OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF, AND APPELLANTS FAILED TO MAKE EX-
CEPTION TO THEM. 
As to the quoted instruction of the trial judge, rela-
tive to Appellant Leach, that "if he is satisfied with the 
evidence which has been given, there is no occasion for 
adding thereto," (Appellants' Brief, p. 20) it is impos-
sible for respondent to understand how appellant could 
have been damaged thereby. 
Counsel go to great lengths to prophesy as to an 
assumed reaction in the minds of the jury on hearing 
the judge's instruction in that regard. Is it not more 
likely that the jury would think instead, "if he is satis-
fied that there is no need for his own testimony, then 
he must have a pretty good case 1" 
Clearly, neither appellant nor respondent are in a 
position to psychoanalyze the jury on this point. There 
i~ no negative inference here that if the defendant is 
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not satisfied with the evidence, he then should take 
the stand. This is indicated by the preceding sen-
tence stating clearly and unequivocally that "no pre-
sumption adverse to a defendant is to arise from the 
mere fact that he does not place himself on the stand." 
That is the law and all there is to it. The point relied 
on by appellant is of no consequence since all that is 
involved is a simple statement of self-evident law and 
fact. 
In the prosecution of an accused who offered no 
evidence, according to Commonu:ealth v. Pinkenson, 
(Pa.), 11 A. 2d 176, a statement in the court's general 
charge, that if counsel for the accused felt that the Com-
monwealth had not proved its case they would naturally 
choose to refrain from offering testimony, was not iJ?-
proper as a reference to the failure of the accused to 
testify, in view of the court's fu1·ther statement that no 
unfavorable inference could be dra"'n by the failure of 
the accused to testify. 
The Texas case of Compton v. State, 184 S. W. 2d 
630, states that a statute prohibiting the consideration 
of defendant's failure to testify as a circumstance 
against him does not prohibit the court from alluding 
to defendant's failure to testify. 
Where an instruction with respect to the nonpreju-
dicial affect of defendant's failure to testify was ade-
quate, refusal to give requested instruction on the same 
subject was not error. Wright v. U. 8., 175 Fed. 2d 384. 
Respondent does not feel that Appellant Leach was 
in any way prejudiced by the instruction Judge Ellett 
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gave. If he used the word ''privilege'' where he should 
have used ''right,'' he did so innocently and it was a 
distinction that escaped the jury's minds. 
A deliberate and deep discussion of semantics un-
doubtedly would bring out a difference between the two 
words, it is true; but a lay person sitting on the jury is 
not going to be persuaded on a mere hearing that 
"privilege" in this connotation means anything more, 
less or different than ''right.'' 
In Brown v. State, (Ark.), 155 S. W. 2d 722, an in-
struction, that it was defendant's privilege either to tes-
tify in his own behalf or to decline to do so and that 
failure to testify was neither evidence of guilt nor a 
presumption thereof and that defendant's failure to 
testify was not to be considered by the jury in deter-
mining defendant's guilt, was proper. 
Many cases concur with the holding in State v. Paul, 
(Iowa), 48 N. W. 2d 309, which is, as quoted from the 
syllabus: 
''All instructions are to be construed together 
in determining the matter of prejudice created 
by any part of the instructions.'' 
See also State v. Spohr, (Kan.), 230 P. 2d 1013; State v. 
Livesay, (Idaho), 233 P. 2d 432; People v. Mercer, 
(Calif.), 230 P. 2d 4. 
Even if the instruction was not proper, reversal 
should not be had, according to a Utah case, Cowley v. 
State, (Utah), 82 P. 2d 914, which held: 
"The court is firmly committed to the rule 
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that an instruction improper and erroneous will 
not be held reversible error where it is manifest 
on consideration of all the instructions given, the 
testimony in the case, and the verdict of the jury 
that such an instruction did not work to the preju-
dice of the defendant or deprive him of any sub-
stantial right." 
Instructions in a criminal case, even if erroneous, 
are not ground for reversal where they are nonprejudi-
cial. State v. Condit, (Utah), 125 P. 2d 801. 
An instruction, upon the trial of an information for 
larceny, though confused and misleading, will not afford 
ground for reversal if nonprejudicial. State v. Hall, 
(Utah), 145 P. 2d 494. 
In the instant case both Leach and l\I r. Reid, counsel 
for Mr. Hines, stated on page 191 of the transcript that 
they had no exceptions to offer to the instructions given 
by Judge Ellett. If they invited the error, appellants 
cannot now take advantage of it. They knowingly and 
openly waived any exceptions they might have had. 
Where neither a defendant nor counsel object in the 
lower court to instructions to the jury, as in this case, 
where, as a matter of fact, both agreed, the appellate 
court in State v. Johnson, (N. Mex.), 287 P. 2d 247, 
stated: 
''Error in the court's instructions to the jury 
were waived when the defendant failed to call to 
the trial court's attention that it might be com-
mitting error, thus offering the court an oppor-
tunity to correct its mistake.'' 
See also U. S. t'. Scoblick, 124 Fed. Supp. 881, aud Rucker 
10 
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r. U. S., 206 Fed. 2d 464. 
Where instructions are palpably erroneous to such 
an extent that they would, if allowed by the jury, prevent 
a fair and proper determination of the issues, the Su-
preme Court may notice the error without exception 
having been taken; but the mere failure to give an in-
struction which might have been given but which was 
not requested or called to the attention of the court will 
not be noticed on appeal in the absence of an exception 
taken to the failure to give the instruction. State v. 
Peterson, (Utah), 240 P. 2d 504. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HINES WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO 
THE READING OF TESTIMONY TO THE JURY AFTER 
THE JURY'S RETIREMENT; AND THE COURT DID 
NOT ALLOW UNDUE EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON 
A PORTION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
No undue emphasis was placed on testimony read 
to the jury, and this is beside the point since Appellant 
Hines and his counsel waived any objection. Respondent 
relies heavily on Hersey v. Tully, (Colo.), 44 P. 854 and 
Jenkins v. Stephens, (Utah), 231 P. 112. In Hersey v. 
Tully, supra, certain testimony was read to the jury 
after the case had been submitted over the objection of 
defend{}IY/,t. In the Jenkins Case, defendant's counsel was 
not notified of the reading. 
No such objections are heard here. As a matter of 
fact and by positive statements, both the appellant and 
counsel ( Tr. 196) agreed to a reading of the testimony 
11 
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to the jury. Appellant waived his rights thereby and 
cannot now object to a reading of the testimony. 
A case in the Supreme Court of Kansas, State v. 
Haines, 278 P. 767, held that it is not error for the court 
on the request of the jury, after it has retired to delib-
erate, to read to the jury an admission made by counsel 
for the defendant concerning what the evidence of a 
witness for the state would be, but who was not present 
when he was called, where the evidence was not objected 
to at the time it was admitted but which would have been 
inadmissible if proper objection had been made. 
Upon receipt of an oral waiver from Hines and Mr. 
Reid, the court came on solid ground in ordering the 
disputed testimony read. The record says, at page 197, 
that the testimony of Mr. Hales and Mr. Crow was read 
to the jury. There is no indication that it was read in 
anything less, or other, than its full context. There is 
nothing to show that a portion only was read. There is 
no showing in the record or by the brief of appellants 
that it was given undue weight. 
There is no indication that the women jurors were 
persuaded to hold for conviction because of having heard 
this testimony. Their decision and the reasons there-
fore are not a matter for inquiry, but their decision 
could likely have been based on persuasive argument and 
conversation on the part of the other jurors. 
State v. Peterson, (Utah), 174 P. 2d 843, cited by 
appellants, is not in point in any way and has no bearing 
on the facts or law of the instant case. 
12 
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POINT IV 
IT WAS DISCRETIONARY WITH THE JUDGE 
WHETHER OR NOT TO REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF 
COUNSEL DURING THE READING OF TESTIMONY 
TO THE JURY AFTER ITS RETIREMENT; AND IT 
WAS NOT ERROR TO ALLOW SUCH READING IN 
COUNSEL'S ABSENCE. 
The respondent does not question at all the power 
of the court to ?rder defendant's counsel to be present 
during the jury's deliberations. The court is not obli-
gated, however, to do so. It is a discretionary matter 
with the judge. 
Clearly, it is not necessary that counsel be in court 
when the defendant's rights are not threatened in any 
way and, as here, where telephone contact is maintained 
by the client and counsel, and judge and counsel. 
Since it is not required that counsel be present in 
court, it follows that the reading of testimony in his 
physical absence, especially, as here, where objection 
was specifically waived by counsel and appellant, is not 
error. Therefore, appellants points 4 and 5 are answered 
together. In this case the appellants suffered no damage 
to their rights whatsoever by counsel's physical absence 
from the courtroom. Both Appellant Hines and his 
counsel, Mr. Reid, were advised of the desire of the 
jurors to have the testimony read to them and both Hines 
and :\Ir. Reid waived any objection they might have 
raised. 
If there is error, it is not prejudicial error, as the 
record gives nothing to indicate that Mr. Reid would 
13 
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have objected even had he been present. :Mr. Reid had 
full knowledge that the testimony would be read before 
he gave his approval and Appellant Hines did likewise. 
All details were available to them; everything was dear. 
They had as much opportunity to object as though both, 
and not Hines only, had been physically present in court. 
The testimony was read simply and clearly, as Mr. 
Reid contemplated it would be. Hines had Mr. Reid's 
representation at all necessary times. It should be em-
phasized that Hines contacted and conversed with Mr. 
Reid by phone before himself stating that he had no 
objection to the reading of the testimony. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah, 
relied on by appellants, does not specify that accused's 
counsel must attend him at all stages of the trial. He 
is guaranteed representation, and, in this case, he re-
ceived it to the fullest necessary extent. The actual 
physical presence of the attorney at every moment, 
especially after the case had been tried, was not neces-
sary, nor do either of the statutes set forth by appellants 
define the nature of the representation required to be 
given or the amount of time the court-appointed counsel 
must spend in the physical presence of his defendants. 
The Crank Case, cited in appellants' brief (p. 26) 
adds nothing to a consideration of this question since it 
too fails to set forth just what constitutes representation 
as contemplated by the above statutes and constitutional 
provision. 
Appellants rely on State ~·. Beeny, (Utah), 203 P. 
2d 397, for their view that where clarification is requested 
14 
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by the jury and counsel has not been waived, the court 
should delay proceedings until a diligent effort can be 
made to secure counsel's presence. 
A careful reading of the Beeny Case indicates the 
court held, however, that after the jury came back into 
court, instructions could then have been given to the 
jury by the court after mere notice to the defendant or 
his counsel; but that assuming that the trial court was 
of the opinion that despite the statutory provisions (that 
notice to appellant was sufficient), the defendants were 
entitled under the Constitution to have counsel present 
when a jury returned to court and that counsel had not 
waived the latter's presence, then, in the premises, the 
court should have delayed the proceedings for such 
length of time as would have sufficed to render diligent 
effort to secure counsel's presence. 
In the instant case, the judge did not in his discre-
tion feel, however, that appellants' rights were being 
denied by absence of counsel since notice had been given 
to counsel; and that being the case, it was not incumbent 
upon the judge to rule that diligent effort be made to 
secure counsel's presence. 
Here, counsel below and Appellant Hines have in-
vited the alleged error by agreeing to the reading of the 
evidence to the jury. Appellants cannot now come in 
and take advantage of any alleged error which they 
themselves brought about. It has frequently been held 
not to be error to proceed with the trial in counsel's 
absence if the accused is not thereby prejudiced. 23 
C. J. S. 80. 
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The Ohio case of Village of Addyston v. Liddle, 6 
N. E. 2d 877, stated: 
'' * * * The right of the party accused to the 
presence of counsel is in the nature of a personal 
privilege and may be waived, and courts need not 
compel attendance or enforce vigilance of counsel. 
The convenience of counsel cannot be allowed to 
obstruct the reasonable dispatch of business." 
People v. Holland, (Calif.), 51 P. 2d 881, holds that 
where defendant's counsel voluntarily absented himself 
from the trial, proceeding with the trial in absence of 
such counsel is not error. 
Two analogous cases are referred to-Morton v. 
State, (Ga.), 10 S. E. 2d 836 and State v. Nichols, (Kan.), 
232 P. 1058. The Morton Case stands for the proposition 
that where counsel for the accused was absent when the 
jury returned and where he did not appear when the 
court had directed an officer to endeavor to locate him, 
and the court had the accused brought inside the bar 
and in regular form polled the jury and then disclosed 
and published the verdict, the return of the verdict in 
the absence of counsel was not prejudicial error. The 
Nichols Case held also that it was not error to receive 
the verdict in the absence of defendant's counsel. 
22 C. J. S. 484 indicates that many cases hold it to 
be discretionary with the court whether or not to con-
tinue a case because of the absence of counsel, and it is 
not error to proceed. 
POINT V 
IT WAS NOT ERROR ON THE PART OF THE COURT 
16 
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TO ALLOW MISS PARKER, THE COURT STENOG-
RAPHER, TO TAKE TWO WOMEN JURORS TO THE 
LADIES' RESTROOM. 
The act of the court reporter, 2\Iiss Parker, in taking 
two women jurors to the ladies' restroom, was not preju-
dicial error. No claim is made that Miss Parker said 
anything whatsoever to the jurors about the case, and 
appellants specifically state, on page 30 of their brief, 
that: 
''No accusation of misconduct is levelled at 
Miss Parker for escorting these jurors to the 
washroom.'' 
The statutes quoted, and several cases, hold that it 
is within the discretion of the court whether or not to 
m let the jury separate during trial. State v. Cano, (Utah), 
~~ 228 P. 563; State v. Seyboldt, (Utah), 236 P. 225; People 
]I v. Callaghan, (Utah), 6 P. 49. The language of the sta-
tute, 77-31-27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, furthermore, 
makes it discretionary with the court whether the jurors 
are to be accompanied by any officer at all. The language 
controlling reads that the jurors may be "permitted to 
separate or be kept in the charge of a proper officer." 
The Seyboldt Case, above, clearly holds that the 
jurors can be allowed to separate on their own and that 
whether an officer is to accompany and keep charge 
over them is discretionary with the court. The statute 
indicates that in the discretion of the court, if "a proper 
officer'' is assigned to have charge of the jurors, the 
officer must be sworn. 
'Vhere the common law prevails rather than a 
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specific statute, State v. Lwze, (Wash.), 222 P. 2d 394, 
''In a prosecution for rape and burglary, the 
fact that bailiff was not sworn to perform the 
duties of his office prior to assuming charge of 
the jury was not error.'' 
Appellants object that Miss Parker was, first, not 
a proper officer and, second, that she should have been 
sworn. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 30 and 31) It is sub-
mitted, in light of the statute above, that if Miss Parker 
was not a ''proper officer,'' she did not need to be sworn. 
Since the jurors could have been separated and could 
have gone alone, it follows that Miss Parker could have 
acted, as she may have done, as a guide only without 
having to assume the character of a ''proper officer'' ; 
and if she was not a ''proper officer,'' it was not neces-
sary for her to be sworn. Although it is not set forth 
in the record, it can be presumed, according to the 
holding Elkins v. State, (Okla.), 233 P. 491, that she was 
sworn. 
Appellants supply, on page 31 of their brief, some 
possibilities that :Miss Parker might have pursued on 
the brief trip to the restroom (an excursion, of course, 
that did not lend itself to any serious discussion of a 
criminal case). They do not, however, as pointed out 
above, allege any misconduct whatsoever on the part of 
Miss Parker in any way. 
Of all the available personnel who might have 
escorted the women jurors to the restroom, Miss Parker 
perhaps was best qualified. She had heard judges, per-
haps hundreds of times, tell jurors not to converse with 
18 
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the one in charge of them during adjournments. As a 
sworn court reporter, she was aware of her serious 
duties as an officer of the court. She was accustomed 
to the procedure and protocol entertained by courts of 
this state. She was aware of penalties for intimidating 
juries. No better choice could be had. 
In light of the fact that no misconduct IS laid by 
appellants to Miss Parker, it should be further pointed 
out that it is presumed that a jury will act in a proper 
and orderly fashion with careful effort to preserve the 
rights of the defendant. This is the holding in Stead-
man v. State, (Tenn.), 282 S. W. 2d 777, wherein it is 
stated: 
''There is a presumption of right acting 
attending a jury so long as it is not guilty of mis-
conduct.'' 
No improper relationship is alleged, except by in-
nuendo, hetwee11 ::..Iiss Parker and the two women jurors. 
N" evertheless, it is interesting to note the holding in 
Parker v. State, (Okla.), 193 P. 2d 607, which indicates 
that a verdict will not be set aside because of improper 
comments between jurors and officers, which comments 
are not of a character calculated to prejudice accused 
or to influence the verdict. 
No objection was shown in the record to the jurors 
going with Miss Parker and counsel was present 
when the court so ordered and counsel said nothing to 
the contrary. 
rrhe Supreme Court of Arkansas has said on thi8 
point in Atterbury v. State, 20 S. W. 411: 
19 
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"We hold that it is too late after verdict to 
object for the first time that a jury retired from 
court in charge of an officer to whom the oath 
had not been administered where it appeared that 
the defendant was present when it retired and 
neither asked that the special oath be adminis-
tered to him nor objected to his taking charge 
of the jury and it does not appear that either 
the officer or the jury was guilty of any mis-
conduct.'' 
The Court should also consider Odell v. Hudspeth, 
( Kan.), 189 Fed. 2d 300, which held : 
"The fact that a sheriff in a murder prosecu-
tion acted as bailiff and custodian of the jury 
during the trial would not void the judgment 
even though the sheriff also was a witness for 
the prosecution.'' 
POINT VI 
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE JURY WAS AT ALL 
TIMES PROPERLY ADMONISHED; THE APPELLANTS 
DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION AT THE TRIAL AND 
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DO SO NOW; AND IF 
THE JURY WAS NOT ADMONISHED IMMEDIATELY 
PRIOR TO A SHORT INFORMAL RECESS, APPEL-
LANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED IN THEIR SUBSTAN-
TIAL RIGHTS. 
Where there is nothing in the record to show that 
the jury was properly admonished, it will be presumed 
that the court performed its duty in that regard. Elkins 
r. State, supra., Redman v. Territory, (Okla.), 37 P. 826, 
holds that in the absence of direct proof to the contrary, 
we must presume that the court below admonished the 
jury, as provided by law, and did all that was necessary 
20 
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to be done. The presumption is that the court duly 
admonished the jury as to their duty. The rule that all 
reasonable presumptions and intendments will be made 
in favor of the ruling of the trial court is one of the best 
settled and most recently applied rules in appellate pro-
cedure. See also Donahue v. State, (Tex.), 236 S. W. 86 
and Caw v. People, 3 Neb. 357. 
In Quayle v. State, (Ariz.), 165 P. 331, the court 
said: 
''The court must presume, the record being 
silent, that the trial court performed its duty, 
and will not inquire for the first time on appeal 
whether that duty has been violated.'' 
People v. Berger, 275 P. 2d 799, reaffirms definite 
law that an appellate court will not indulge in presump-
tions to defeat a judgment. 
"The appellants were present at the trial and 
might have objected, and should have objected, 
to any failure of the trial court to follow the 
prescribed procedure. We presume, if appellants 
deemed their rights jeopardized by the alleged 
omission, that they would, therefore, have ob-
jected; and if they saw and did not object, or 
failed to see any irregularity in the matter, they 
waived it and cannot be heard to complain for 
the first time on appeal.'' 
Yarborough v. State, (Okla.), 162 P. 2d 678 and State 
v. 111orris, (Ore.), 114 P. 476, both hold that where the 
defendant does not object to the failure of the court to 
give the proper admonition, it would be presumed on 
appeal that the error did not work any substantial 
prejudice to his rights. 
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POINT VII 
IF ERRORS WERE MADE BY THE COURT BELOW, 
THEY WERE, IN EVERY CASE, NONPREJUDICIAL 
ERRORS WITHOUT NEGATIVE AFFECT UPON THE 
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED APPEL-
LANTS. 
The recent Utah case, State v. Neal, 262 P. 2d 756, 
approves and sustains this line of reasoning in stating 
that the court will not reverse criminal causes for mere 
error or irregularity. It is only where there has been 
error which' is both substantial and prejudicial to the 
rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted. Other 
Utah cases holding with, and precedent for, the Neal 
Case are State v. Romeo, 128 P. 530; State v. Estes, 176 
P. 271; and State v. Woods, 220 P. 215. 
Here, the judge and the jury were very careful to 
preserve the rights of defendants, Leach and Hines, to 
the best of their ability. This is especially manifest by 
the great effort the judge went to in affording ~1r. Leach 
a reputable attorney and allowing him, on rejection of 
~fr. Reid, to obtain one of his own. 
A conviction will not be set aside for mere technical 
errors of the accused. State v. Thompson, (Ariz.), 206 
P. 2d 1037. 
In the absence of proof to the contrary, proceedings 
of a court properly exercising criminal jurisdiction are 
presumed to be regular, and mere failure of the records 
to show it does not overcome this presumption; and after 
a verdict, all permissible inferences must be made in 
the fayor of the prosecution. This is made clear by 
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77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which states. 
''After hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. If error has been committed, it shall not 
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The 
court must be satisfied that it has that effect 
before it is warranted in reversing the judgment.'' 
Ordinarily the Supreme Court refuses to review 
matters not excepted to in the trial court. Since being 
a court of review, it should first allow the trial court the 
opportunity to rule on matters brought before it for 
consideration. State v. Peterson., (Utah), supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lo\ve,r court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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